

## FROM ANALYTIC PSYCHOLOGY TO ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY: THE RECEPTION OF TWARDOWSKI'S IDEAS IN CAMBRIDGE

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### *Introduction*

Thomas Baldwin, Nicholas Griffin and Peter Hylton have done much to show in what way the idealism of T.H. Green and F.H. Bradley was an important factor in the origin of British analytic philosophy and especially in the development of Moore's and Russell's thought. Baldwin's monograph on Moore, published in 1990, and the monographs of both Hylton and Griffin on Russell, published in 1990 and 1991, show not only that Russell and Moore had been idealistic philosophers in their youth, but also that idealistic themes influenced their later, realist philosophy. There need thus be no doubt about the influence of idealistic philosophy on the origin of British analytic philosophy. Those monographs leave open a question, though: Is the reaction towards idealism purely an immanent development of British philosophy, or were Moore and Russell influenced by other, less idealistic types of philosophy?

In this paper I deal with this question by studying the early writings of Twardowski, on the one hand, and those of Moore and Russell in the period from 1899 to 1903, on the other. It may be questioned whether the theories of Moore and Russell in that period can be characterized as analytic: they are not analytic in the sense in which we call Russell's "On Denoting" (1905) analytic in so far as "On Denoting" is a paradigm of analytic philosophy as critique of language. Taking a broader concept of analytic philosophy we may call their philosophies in that period analytic, however, because at that time Moore and Russell consider analysis a fruitful method in philosophy. For them, the analysis of thought is possible through the analysis of language or through the analysis of our acts and their objects. This notion of analysis does not set off analytic philosophy against phenomenology or descriptive psychology. My aim is to show that the transition from idealism to analytic philosophy was much smoother than is sometimes believed, because the transition was prepared by continental and British theories of the mind. These theories of the mind we find both in philosophy and in psychology – two fields that at the end of the nineteenth century were not separate. My thesis is historical: my aim is to show that twentieth century, British analytic philosophy emerged from a much broader field of philosophies than sometimes is believed. Contemporary philosophy can profit from the ideas in this broader field from which analytic philosophy originated, for example, in the theory of wholes and parts, in the way we think that analysis might still be a fruitful method for philosophy, and

in dealing with problems around meaning and indexicality, and in the theory of judgment in general.

At the end of the nineteenth century, Oxford philosophy was rather hostile towards psychology. Philosophers at Cambridge, with their appreciation for science as a whole, had more interest in psychology. At the beginning of the 1890s, Moore and Russell were students at Cambridge, and their teachers were Ward, Stout, and McTaggart. These philosophers are said to have held idealistic views, which is correct to a certain extent. But, leaving McTaggart aside, Ward and Stout were also psychologists. Stout's important work *Analytic Psychology* was published in 1896, and it was read by Moore and Russell.<sup>1</sup> The method of analytic psychology which Stout presents here presupposes a new theory of wholes, parts, and relations for mental acts and their objects, which can be found in the same work, and which can be seen as a reaction towards the association theory and towards Bradley's theory of wholes and parts.

The term 'analytic psychology' Stout uses as a translation of Brentano's term 'deskriptive Psychologie'. The aim of analytic psychology is "to discover the ultimate and irreducible constituents of consciousness in general".<sup>2</sup> Stout's project is essentially Brentanian: in his writings there are frequent references to Brentano and his pupils Stumpf, Ehrenfels, and Meinong. Stout stands not only in a British psychological tradition in so far as he is a pupil of Ward: he also stands in a continental tradition, where new theories of wholes and parts became an important part of philosophy.<sup>3</sup> At first, these theories were part of psychology and philosophy of mind; later, they also became part of ontology.

The new theories of wholes and parts, in which parts can be considered independently of their whole, made it possible to overcome the idealistic theory of judgment which conceives of Reality as a whole as the only subject of our judgments. For Bradley: "Judgment proper is the act which refers an ideal content (recognized as such) to a reality beyond the act".<sup>4</sup> This reality is always the one whole. For Bradley, judgments function as truth-bearers. Bradley's theory of judgment is not subjectivistic, but a judging mind plays an important role in the constitution of the unity of the proposition, for a judging act is needed to unite a predicate with the subject. A judging mind considers ideal contents, or meanings, which are aspects of a total experience or reality, and

<sup>1</sup> Russell read Stout's *Analytic Psychology* "as soon as it came out"; see [Griffin 1991], 34. Moore read Stout's *Analytic Psychology* and *A Manual of Psychology* "with a good deal of attention": see [Moore 1968], 29, where he also makes clear that he feels at home with the topics dealt with in these books. Russell attended the lectures on history of philosophy in 1893/94 and Moore did so two years later [Griffin 1991], 33, n.28; 33-35. Further, Russell and Moore had many discussions with Stout from then onwards, as they say.

<sup>2</sup> [Stout 1909], I, p. 36.

<sup>3</sup> See [Schaar 1991], chapter II.

<sup>4</sup> [Bradley 1922], §10.

predicates these contents of reality.<sup>5</sup> In Kant's theory, the unity of our judgments plays a crucial role; this unity, and therefore the truth-bearer, is dependent upon an act of combining. For both Kant and Bradley, the unity of a judgment depends upon a mental, unifying act. Peter Hylton and Thomas Baldwin have shown that a new theory of judgment, in which the truth-bearer is no longer conceived of as somehow dependent upon any mind, was the first aim of Moore and Russell, when they presented their new philosophies.<sup>6</sup> In this paper I deal with the question whether at the end of the nineteenth century there were non-idealistic theories of judgment or theories on other topics, such as wholes and parts, which had an influence on the new theories of judgment of Moore and Russell.

I do not consider all possible influences from Brentanian philosophers on the origin of British analytic philosophy, not to mention the possibilities of other non-idealistic influences. I do not explicitly deal with a possible influence of Meinong on the younger Moore or Russell, nor with the influence of Stumpf, another early pupil of Brentano.<sup>7</sup> The question of Brentano's influence I keep on the background. In this paper I give my attention to one pupil of Brentano, Kasimir Twardowski, who is famous for his work on content and object: *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*. The distinction between content and object is not often associated with the writings of Moore and Russell, but it has been of importance in so far as it influenced their theories of objects. Further, Twardowski's theory of objects has a striking resemblance with the theories of objects presented by Moore and Russell, as we shall see. It seems not very likely, though, that Russell or Moore ever read Twardowski. How then could his writings be of any importance for the origin of British analytic philosophy?

Twardowski's dissertation on Descartes of 1892 and his work on content and object of 1894 received anonymous reviews in *Mind*, respectively in 1892 and 1894. *Zur Lehre* especially is highly esteemed; it is called "an excellent piece of psychological analysis." Both the distinction between content and object and the arguments for it are treated in the review; Twardowski's theory of wholes and parts and his theory of general objects are also discussed. Judging from some idiosyncratic expressions and ideas in the review, the

<sup>5</sup> Sometimes Bradley expresses himself in a more objectivistic way: "In the act of assertion we transfer this adjective to, and unite it with, a real substantive. And we perceive at the same time, that the relation thus set up is neither made by the act, nor merely holds within it or by right if it, but is real both independent of and beyond it." [Bradley 1922], §10. I take it that Bradley means to say here that the unity of adjective or predicate and real substantive is not dependent upon an individual act of judging.

<sup>6</sup> See [Baldwin 1984] and [Hylton 1984].

<sup>7</sup> Stumpf's theory of wholes and parts influenced both Twardowski and Stout; his direct influence on Russell seems to be restricted to the theory of space.

reviewer was Stout, the editor of *Mind*.<sup>8</sup> Stout, I claim in this essay, was a mediator between the theories of Brentano and Twardowski and the realism of Moore and Russell in so far as Stout knew the theories of Brentano and Twardowski and made them known to Moore and Russell.

### 1. *The distinction between content and object: origin and arguments*

Although Bolzano already drew a distinction between act, content, and object in his *Wissenschaftslehre* of 1837 [§ 49], this distinction was not common in the nineteenth century. The two-fold distinction between act and object was much more usual at that time; it was put forward by Herbart, Ward, and Brentano. Brentano's notion of object is not distinguished from the notion of content: for him, the object is both part of the act and that to which the act is directed. Both Twardowski and Stout reacted to Brentano's ambiguous notion of object. Of Brentano's pupils, Marty was probably the first to put forward the distinction between act, content, and object, in an article on the semantics of subjectless sentences of 1884. Twardowski generalizes the distinction to the philosophy of mind, gives arguments for it, and elaborates on the notions of content and object in 1894.

Stout already mentions the distinction in a footnote of an article published in 1892.<sup>9</sup> A year later he gives more attention to the distinction.<sup>10</sup> Stout claims that there are two aspects of cognitive consciousness (of an 'idea', which is a mental state, act or attitude): 1) thought-reference, sometimes called 'objective reference',<sup>11</sup> that is, reference to an intended object; and 2) a content of consciousness, which determines the direction of thought to this or that special

<sup>8</sup> The reviewer makes the following comment on the term 'act': "...we should prefer to say 'attitude'..."; this is Stout's terminology (Stout, though, does not draw a distinction between a spontaneous act, such as an affirmation, and an attitude, such as a conviction). Concerning thinking of an absurd object, the reviewer writes: "The felt failure to work out the idea of the absurdity is itself part of the content presented in the idea through which is presented the absurdity of the object." The specific terminology cannot be found in Twardowski. In Stout's *Analytic Psychology* we read: "*The felt failure to combine round and square in one image is itself part of that content of consciousness through which the absurdity of the object is presented.*" [Stout 1909], I, 45; I have italicised the common parts. Typical of Stout is also the reviewer's use of the terms 'apprehension of form' and 'form of apprehension'.

<sup>9</sup> [Stout 1892b], 108.

<sup>10</sup> [Stout 1893], 112.

<sup>11</sup> The term 'objective reference' is also used by Russell in one of his Cambridge Essays (c.1894): "besides their existence and their nature, our ideas [= 'mental states'] have what we may call *meaning*. This word is used to denote their objective reference, that is, their reference to something beyond themselves..." [Russell 1983], 196. Then Russell presents a typical Brentanian idea: what is referred to is studied by Physics; the mental states are studied by Psychology.

object; the content is called 'presentation', or less ambiguously, 'presented content'. Content and object are distinct notions on this account. This means that Stout drew the distinction before Twardowski elaborated on it in 1894.

Two of the arguments that Stout gives in his *Analytic Psychology* are repeated from the review of Twardowski's *Zur Lehre*, but Stout does not mention Twardowski. In *Analytic Psychology*, Stout's first argument for the distinction between content and object of an act is the following: the object of an act may not exist, whereas every act has an existing content, because the content is a part of the act, or, as Stout says, because the content is a modification of consciousness.<sup>12</sup> This argument can also be found in *Zur Lehre*.<sup>13</sup> Secondly, Stout says that the object may have properties that are not properties of the content. I may think of an absurd object, an object with properties that are incompatible with each other, but the content which mediates my thought is not absurd, for this would exclude its existence. When I think of eternity, the specific modifications of consciousness are not eternal, but the object is. This argument, together with the example of an object with incompatible properties, can also be found in *Zur Lehre*.<sup>14</sup> Neither Twardowski nor Stout noticed that these arguments can also be considered as arguments for the distinction between act and object.

Stout's third argument is only partly the same as one of Twardowski's. According to Stout, the content may change while the object remains the same, and *vice versa*; for example, when I approach a tree, the visual presentations or mediating contents change, whereas the real magnitude stays the same. It is also possible that the same visual magnitude stands for different real magnitudes, that is, the object is different but the content is the same.<sup>15</sup> We can speak of a difference of objects only if there is a difference of situations or perceivers; otherwise this thesis would be incompatible with Stout's saying that, given a certain situation, the content defines and determines the direction of thought to a certain object.<sup>16</sup> Only the first half of this argument is present in Twardowski. For him, content and object are distinct, because different contents may have the same object, they may have the same range (*Umfang*). Presentations that have the same object but different contents Twardowski calls interchangeable

<sup>12</sup> A more concrete form of this argument Stout already gives in 1893: the object of desire cannot be the immediate content of consciousness, for there would be nothing left to desire if that object itself were present at the moment it is desired see [Stout 1893], 112].

<sup>13</sup> [Twardowski 1982], 30.

<sup>14</sup> [Twardowski 1982], 31.

<sup>15</sup> [Stout 1909], I, 43, 44.

<sup>16</sup> [Stout 1909], I, 47. This argument is not well known in the literature on the distinction between content and object, but it has gained importance in discussions on indexicality. When two persons say 'I am thirsty', we may say that both judgments have the same content, but that their objects differ; here, contents are conceived of as repeatable entities.

presentations (*Wechselvorstellungen*<sup>17</sup>); for example, my presentational act the thought of the city located at the site of the Roman Juvavum and my presentational act the thought of the birthplace of Mozart are both presentations of Salzburg, but their contents differ. Twardowski's example, which, to a certain extent, is similar to Frege's morning star/evening star example, is clearer than Stout's. Stout seems to restrict his thesis to perception, and he deals with the idea of different objects presented by the same content as if it were of the same sort as the idea of different contents with the same object. Although Stout drew the distinction between content and object independently of Twardowski, he elaborated on the distinction under Twardowski's influence.

The distinction between content and object is drawn by Russell and Moore, too. At the beginning of "The Nature of Judgment" (1899), Moore contrasts his notion of concept, which functions as object of thought, with Bradley's notion of (part of) the content of an idea. Moore also draws the distinction in an article written in 1899, later published in James Baldwin's *Dictionary*.<sup>18</sup> Moore says that the object of a belief, a proposition, is not the same as the attribute or content of such belief. Here, Moore is denying not so much the existence of a content; he is denying the relevance of this notion for the theory of judgment and for semantics. Later, Moore says that the only difference between acts of the same type is a difference between their objects; there is no content at all.<sup>19</sup> Russell draws a distinction between content and object in one of his articles on Meinong, that is, not earlier than 1904.<sup>20</sup> The argument he gives comes directly from Meinong, and Meinong got it from Twardowski: the content of a presentation exists in so far as the presentation exists, but the object need not exist – it may be self-contradictory, or possible but not actual, such as a golden mountain.

## 2. The notion of content

Both for Twardowski and Stout, the content is something psychical. For Stout, the content is a "modification of individual consciousness".<sup>21</sup> Similarly, for Twardowski, the content exists in as much as the psychic act exists.<sup>22</sup> The content's role is to mediate between act and object; it is that which directs my consciousness to a special object.

<sup>17</sup> The term comes from Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre*, §96, but Bolzano defines 'Wechselvorstellungen' differently. For him, the term 'Vorstellung' is taken not in the sense of act, but in the sense of objective *Vorstellung an sich*.

<sup>18</sup> [Moore 1901-02]; [Baldwin 1990], esp. p. 16.

<sup>19</sup> See Moore's review of Messer's *Empfindung und Denken* (1910).

<sup>20</sup> [Russell 1973b], 14.

<sup>21</sup> [Stout 1909], I, 47.

<sup>22</sup> [Twardowski 1982], 10, 30.

The most important difference between Twardowski and Stout with respect to their notion of content concerns the theory of meaning. According to Stout, it is the object of thought that functions as meaning-entity. The meaning or 'signification' of a word can be determined only as occurring in a certain proposition or question. Only within such a context do our words have signification: 'the man' stands for a concrete individual man differing from proposition to proposition. This is not essentially different in the case of 'a man' or 'man'; the signification of such a term differs each time it is used. This type of meaning is called *occasional meaning*; it may be contrasted with the *general meaning* of a word, which is a condition for application of that word. Here Stout seems to defend a two-level semantics. I do not believe, though, that such a semantics represents his position in *Analytic Psychology*, or in his later work. The names 'occasional meaning' and 'general or usual meaning' are not Stout's, but translations of terms used by Hermann Paul. Further, Stout is very skeptical about an identical element pervading all the applications of a word: the general meaning is a mere fiction, he says.<sup>23</sup> In so far as Stout believes that the meanings of our terms are objects of thought, his theory runs ahead of the theories of meaning as presented by Moore and Russell. The difference between them is that, for Moore and Russell, a (non-indexical) term has the same meaning whenever it is used.

For Twardowski, the content functions as the meaning of our terms; he espouses a two-layer semantics. The meaning of a term is a content of presentation; the object is what is named by a term. Twardowski says that someone who uses a name intends to awaken the same content in the hearer,<sup>24</sup> but it is not clear whether he really means to say here that the contents may be identical, for the content is, for him, a dependent part of an act.

Twardowski's theory of meaning can be criticized because he sometimes conceives of the content as a kind of object. For example, he calls the content the 'intentional' or 'immanent object'. Following Benno Kerry, Twardowski thinks that the distinction between content and object is relative.<sup>25</sup> A content of presentation may become an object of another act of presentation; here Twardowski conceives of the distinction between content and object mainly as a distinction between different roles. Further, Twardowski compares the distinction between object and content with that between a landscape and a picture of it; because he sometimes conceives of the content as a picture, the content is conceived of as a kind of object. Besides, Twardowski himself speaks of a double object belonging to a presentation.<sup>26</sup> I think that we give too much credit to Twardowski if we say that for him the content is not an object at

<sup>23</sup> [Stout 1909], I, 216-217.

<sup>24</sup> [Twardowski 1982], 11.

<sup>25</sup> [Twardowski 1982], 63.

<sup>26</sup> "Dem Verbum Vorstellen entspricht in ähnlicher Weise wie dem Verbum Malen zunächst ein doppeltes Object – ein Gegenstand, der vorgestellt wird, und ein Inhalt der vorgestellt wird." [Twardowski 1982], 14.

all, as Jens Cavallin does.<sup>27</sup> Husserl's critique that in Twardowski's theory there is a duplication of objects is correct in so far as every act has for Twardowski both an object and a content, while the latter is not essentially different from an object. The primary function of a content is to mediate between act and object. If the content itself is some kind of object, we need a new mediator between act and content. This leads to an infinite regress. Because Twardowski conceives of the content as a part of a psychical act and as a picture of the object, Husserl criticizes him for defending a psychologistic theory of meaning. For different persons the thought of a tree can be mediated by the phantasm of a pine-tree, by that of a lime, or by the word 'tree': such a content is too individual to function as meaning-entity.<sup>28</sup> For the same reason Moore and Russell denied the relevance of the notion of content for a theory of meaning.

Whenever Moore and Russell draw a distinction between content and object, they always regard the content as something psychological and subjective, and thus, for them, as ineligible to be the meaning of a term. Stout may have had some influence on their semantics in the sense that Stout also put forward the thesis that it is not the contents but the objects of thought which form the meanings of our terms. A double-object theory, such as Twardowski's, is in danger of becoming a representational theory of knowledge, something that Moore was eager to avoid: according to Moore, we know not the representations of objects, but the objects themselves. Russell draws the three-fold distinction between act, content, and object for beliefs again in 1919:<sup>29</sup> the content is that which is believed, it consists of images and is clearly psychological.

### 3. *The notion of object*

For Twardowski, every act has both a content and an object. Although every act has an object, the object need not exist. The object is a unified whole, to which we could apply the scholastic term *unum*. In being a unified whole an object is different from all other objects and is self-identical.<sup>30</sup> For Twardowski, the object is a bearer of different properties; the object transcends an individual act of presentation: different presentations may present one and the same object. In so far as presentations are concerned, it is not a relevant question whether the intended object exists or not.<sup>31</sup> The object exists, if it can

<sup>27</sup> [Cavallin 1990], 93, 94.

<sup>28</sup> [Husserl 1979b], 349, n.

<sup>29</sup> [Russell 1969b], 304ff.

<sup>30</sup> "[I]ndem jeder Gegenstand einer, ein einheitliches Ganze ist, hebt er sich gegen alle anderen, als von allen anderen verschieden, und demnach als der, der er ist, als mit sich identischer, ab." [Twardowski 1982], 91.

<sup>31</sup> [Twardowski 1982], 27.



be acknowledged in a correct, positive judgment. The object that I judge to exist is the same as the object that is merely presented or thought of. Twardowski would agree with Husserl that the same Berlin of which I am merely thinking, exists.<sup>32</sup> He differs from Husserl in saying that there is also an object when I think of a golden mountain. Using this notion of object, the object is a possible object of thought, but not dependent upon a certain act of thought. Whereas the content is a dependent part of a mental act, the object is not.

Twardowski presents a “metaphysics” – his name for the most general science of objects. These objects are also the objects of the special sciences such as physics. Whereas Twardowski starts with a psychological investigation into the different aspects of our mental acts, he himself says that this investigation results in a metaphysics which investigates the object as *summum genus*.<sup>33</sup> Objects are real, such as acts or persons, or not real, such as contents or a lack of something. My lack of money, which I am thinking of at this moment, is, regrettably, independent of my act of thinking. Objects are possible or impossible, such as a round square; they exist or they do not, such as a golden mountain. All these objects are ‘something’. They have in common that they *may be* or actually are objects of mental acts.<sup>34</sup> All objects are *entia*; but this does not mean that they also exist.

What the sense of ‘being’ or *ens* is, for Twardowski, is not so clear. His theory does not imply some form of realism. He does not want to be committed to any standpoint in the discussion between idealism and realism; such questions, we might say, are bracketed.<sup>35</sup> An equivalent for ‘object’ is ‘Phaenomen’, as Twardowski says. Concerning the independence of the object from the act of presentation, Twardowski says: we just take the object to be independent of our act of thinking; judgment and presentation are directed to an object which is *presumed* to be independent of our thinking.<sup>36</sup> The fact that he does not commit himself to a certain philosophical position makes him hover between different notions of object.<sup>37</sup> Twardowski does not want to commit

<sup>32</sup> Husserl says: “*Dasselbe* Berlin, das ich vorstelle, existiert auch.” [Husserl 1979b], 353,n; compare: [Husserl 1984], 439; cf. [Husserl 1979a], 305, 308.

<sup>33</sup> [Twardowski 1982], 37, 39.

<sup>34</sup> “Allen is gemeinsam, dass sie Object (*nicht* das intentionale!) psychischer Acte sein können oder sind...” [Twardowski 1982], 40. The term ‘das intentionale Object’ refers here to a terminology used by others for the content of a mental act, see [Twardowski 1982], 4.

<sup>35</sup> [Twardowski 1982], 35-36.

<sup>36</sup> A presentation “bezieht sich auf einen als unabhängig vom Denken angenommenen Gegenstand” [Twardowski 1982], 9.

<sup>37</sup> I fully agree with Grossmann, in his introduction to the translation of *Zur Lehre*, that there is an ambiguity in Twardowski’s notion of object. Twardowski hovers between the notion of ‘object’ as transcending an individual act, as described above, and the object as merely a correlate of an act, so that the object has an analogy with the content of that act.

himself to either idealism or realism; concerning the question of monism and pluralism, Twardowski clearly defends a form of pluralism, in so far as, for him, an object is a unity different from other objects.

Stout's position concerning the objects of our acts comes close to that of Twardowski. Like Twardowski, the early Stout starts with analysing mental acts. A presentation consists of two aspects: thought-reference or objective reference and having a content (as we have seen in section one). As for Twardowski, for Stout all our acts have an object. The object referred to, whether it be fictitious, non-fictitious, or absurd, is taken to be independent of our act of thinking.<sup>38</sup> Just as for Twardowski, questions of existence are relevant only when we judge.<sup>39</sup> The early Stout also wants to delay the question about which philosophical position he defends.

Twardowski and Stout have the same background; we may see them both as working under Brentano's project. On the topic that Husserl calls 'the paradox of objectless presentations', they both side with Brentano. The paradox has the following form: every presentational act has (*entspricht*) an object, is directed towards an object, as this is what distinguishes mental acts or psychological phenomena from physical phenomena (Brentano's view); it is not the case that every presentation has an object, since not every presentation corresponds to something existent (Bolzano's view).<sup>40</sup> Twardowski and Stout take the former line, for they say that although a round square cannot exist, it can be an object of thought, as it is the presented bearer of properties. The main question of Twardowski and Stout is one of (philosophical) psychology: What is a presentation, and what is an act of judgment? The primary function of the object is to be object of an act; and the primary function of the content is to direct our thought towards a certain object. Their central question can be contrasted with Bolzano's main question, which is a logico-semantical one: What is the meaning of the terms we use, and how can the objectivity of logic and (religious) science be guaranteed? From Bolzano's point of view, contents are primarily objective meaning-entities. Every act needs an objective content in order to make sense, but there need not always be an object. Twardowski presents himself as following Bolzano, and especially presents his notion of content as being similar to Bolzano's notion of *Vorstellung an sich*, but, contrary to Bolzano's notion, Twardowski's notion of content is psychological. Although Twardowski conceives the content of an act as the bearer of meaning, his aim is not that of Bolzano; his general conception is a psychological one, just as that of Stout.

Moore's notion of concept in "The Nature of Judgment" is as broad as Twardowski's and Stout's notion of object. Everything that is a possible object for thought is a concept: a rose, red, a chimera, a number, this, truth, existence. For Moore, being a possible object for thought is the main function of a

<sup>38</sup> [Stout 1909], I, 45.

<sup>39</sup> [Stout 1909], I, 46; II, 260; [Stout 1891b], 449.

<sup>40</sup> [Husserl 1979a], 303.

concept; as for Twardowski and Stout, Moore's central question is mainly a psychological one. In this sense he is closer to them than Russell is.<sup>41</sup>

Moore is eager to defend, in opposition to Bradley, the thesis that the objects of thought are independent of any mental act. For Moore, concepts are not only taken as independent of a thinking mind: they really *are* independent of any mind. A concept is what our judgments are about; they are the primary objects of knowledge and understanding. The distinction between *being* and *existence* is also present in Moore's writings. All concepts have being; only some have existence. The category of *being* is fundamental and all-embracing. Moore's distinction between *being* and *existence* runs parallel to a similar distinction in Stout and Twardowski.<sup>42</sup> Moore's notion of *being* as the most general characteristic of objects is parallel to Twardowski's notion of *ens* as *summum genus*. *Existence*, for Moore, is a concept logically dependent upon the notion of *propositional truth* (see the next section). This is comparable to the idea in Stout and Twardowski that questions of existence arise only where there is judgment.

Moore stresses that the object of thought, which he calls a *concept*, is not to be identified with a content, a part of a mental act or an attribute of such an act.<sup>43</sup> For the concept is what it is, no matter whether or not anybody thinks of it.<sup>44</sup> A concept has an independent and immutable being. For Moore, everything that is has an independent existence; in this he agrees with Bradley, although for Bradley this holds only for the one whole. For Moore, the basic elements of the world are concepts; they are irreducible to anything else; they form a *genus per se*. In contrast to the tradition and to Bradley, Moore believes that relations are not produced by the mind. For Moore, relations are concepts and in this sense they are as self-contained as concepts like *red* or *rose*. Moore is clearly defending a form of pluralism, which is also present in Twardowski's and Stout's writings. There is also a difference between these philosophers: Moore's theory is more strongly anti-psychologistic than that of Stout or Twardowski. Moore explicitly defends a form of realism; concepts are independent of any mind. Moore's concepts are also different from Twardowski's or Stout's objects in so far as they are Platonic, immutable entities.

Concerning the theory of meaning, Moore sides with Stout, not with Twardowski. For Moore, the objects of thought are the entities of meaning. He criticizes any content-theory of meaning, because a content is either a

<sup>41</sup> Concerning the question whether he was willing and able to lecture on Psychology, Moore says that he had no difficulty in teaching under the name of Psychology, for that was really philosophy of mind, dealing with topics from the works of Ward, James, and Stout: "a good many of the subjects discussed in them were subjects on which I had thought a great deal and thought as hard as I could." [Moore 1968], 29.

<sup>42</sup> Hylton, though, sees the distinction between *being* and *existence* as one evolving out of the Kantian distinction between *noumena* and *phenomena*.

<sup>43</sup> [Moore 1899], 177-178; [Moore 1901-02], 717.

<sup>44</sup> [Moore 1899], 179.

dependent part of a mental act or a result of an abstraction. If the content is the result of an abstraction, someone has to make the abstraction.<sup>45</sup> We might call Moore's semantics a theory of reference, because the meaning of a term is what that term stands for, so that meaning-entities determine the truth-values of the proposition of which they form part. A similar theory we have found in Stout. In his publications after 1899, Moore defends a somewhat revised version of this theory, for he acknowledges both universals and particulars, but he still defends a one-level theory of meaning, because both universals and particulars are what our terms stand for.<sup>46</sup>

Although Moore does not explicitly say anything about the problem of how two different terms may stand for the same object, it is implied by his theory that the (conceptual) object of the thought expressed by the words 'the capital of Prussia' is not the same as the object of the thought expressed by the words 'the largest town in Germany'. For, one object contains the concept *capital* as a part; the other the concept *largest town*. Both complex concepts are related to each other, and to a certain place and time, themselves concepts, so that they form part of the very complex concept we call 'Berlin'.<sup>47</sup>

For Russell, in *The Principles of Mathematics* [§47], every individual object or *term* is a logical subject to which different properties can be attributed; a term is a unity, it is one.<sup>48</sup> A term is numerically identical with itself and numerically diverse from other terms, which means that there is a plurality of terms. Further, a term is anything that can be mentioned, and a term or entity is whatever may be an object of thought.

Like Stout and Moore, Russell conceives the objects of our thought to be the bearers of meaning. Just like Moore, Russell says that all terms have being, whereas only some can be said to exist. Socrates, a chimera, and the number 2 are entities that can be counted, and therefore they must certainly be.<sup>49</sup> Further, Russell's terms are like Moore's concepts in being immutable and indestructible. There is also a difference from Moore's theory of concepts in so far as Russell acknowledges terms of different categories: things, which can be indicated by proper names; and concepts, indicated by all other words (concepts include relations and predicates). A concept may have a role as term, when it occurs as subject of a proposition, or it may have a role as meaning, when it does not occur as a subject. We see that Russell's semantics is more

<sup>45</sup> Actually, his objection is that there is an infinite regress: abstraction presupposes judgment, which implies meaning [Moore 1899], 178.

<sup>46</sup> [Baldwin 1990], 47.

<sup>47</sup> The example is taken from a review by Moore of 1910; the reviewed book is Messer's *Empfindung und Denken*. In that review Moore says that the two acts have the same object, but that they *contain* acts with different objects. A theory about the relations between an act and its act-parts is not given, but seems to be of some interest.

<sup>48</sup> Russell uses the word 'object' in a wider sense to cover both singular entities (terms) and plural entities [Russell 1992], 35, n.

<sup>49</sup> [Russell 1992], §47 and §427.

complex than Moore's, because of Russell's theory of denoting. The proposition in which the concept *a man* occurs as subject is not about that concept, but about an actual man denoted or meant by that concept.<sup>50</sup> A proposition containing such concepts as *all men* or *every man* as subject is about the object denoted by these concepts; this object is a plurality or set of terms (all individual men) combined in certain ways.<sup>51</sup> Some concepts, such as *a chimera* and *nothing*, are 'denoting concepts' which do not denote.<sup>52</sup> The denoting phrase 'a chimera' has a meaning but not a denotation.<sup>53</sup>

It is said that Russell's theory of terms as we know it from the *Principles* was influenced by Meinong's theory of objects. Apart from the fact that many of the Meinongian ideas are foreshadowed by Twardowski, we should ask whether Russell had a theory of terms before he read Meinong. In 1898 Russell worked on a manuscript, titled "An Analysis of Mathematical Reasoning", which was not published at that time. The remaining parts of it were published in the *Collected Papers* in 1990. According to Griffin, Russell, when he finished the manuscript in July 1898, had not read any work of Meinong closely.<sup>54</sup> According to Hylton, the influence that Meinong had on Russell was only of minor importance. I cannot decide here on the question of Meinong's influence on the early Russell, but whatever we find of a theory of objects in "Analysis" diminishes the importance of Meinong's influence on Russell concerning this topic, if it is true that Russell had not read Meinong at that time.<sup>55</sup>

Russell starts in "Analysis" by presenting a theory of judgments and their elements. Besides distinguishing different types of relational judgments, Russell says in "Analysis" that subject-predicate judgments make up the foremost class of judgments. Russell's notion of judgment differs from Bradley's notion: it is not Reality as a whole that is the logical subject of all our judgments; any *term*, anything that can be thought of, may be a logical subject;<sup>56</sup> when a term functions as an object of thought, Russell calls it an idea. Each of the logical subjects is one. Their being one is the most important characteristic of terms, or logical subjects. It means that every term is a unity, and as such differs from other terms; it is countable, therefore. A term has, besides a logical role as the subject of a judgment, a psychological role, for it is the object of thought, and a semantical role, for it can be represented by a word. In this sense "Analysis" is a forerunner of the *Principles*.

<sup>50</sup> [Russell 1992], §51.

<sup>51</sup> [Russell 1992], §62.

<sup>52</sup> [Russell 1992], §73.

<sup>53</sup> [Griffin 1993], 163, 172.

<sup>54</sup> [Russell 1990a], 147.

<sup>55</sup> When Russell studied under Ward, Ward recommended Meinong's book on Hume's relation theory, published in 1882, a topic in which Russell was always interested.

<sup>56</sup> [Russell 1990b], 168.

It seems that Russell defends a theory of possible objects already in “Analysis”. This interpretation is confirmed by what is said above, and by Russell’s saying that every possible idea, *i.e.*, every idea that does not involve a contradiction, may be a logical subject – by “every idea” he means “everything imaginable”.<sup>57</sup> Griffin does not believe that Russell is presenting here a theory of possible objects. He says that the distinction that Russell draws here between *being*, belonging to anything that can be counted, and *existence*, belonging to actually existing objects, is not comparable to the distinction between *being* and *existence* in the *Principles*, because it is numbers, relations, and classes rather than possible, non-actual objects that are said to have being in “Analysis”. Griffin doubts whether *being* for Russell is an ontological category at all; it might just mean what can be counted as one.<sup>58</sup> This is confirmed by passages from the 1898 manuscript, such as: “By *being*... I mean that which is involved in counting, in saying ‘this is one’”.<sup>59</sup> It is not unlikely that Russell’s theory is not fully worked out yet; we should not forget that “Analysis” is only a manuscript. More important, the year 1898 for Russell is pre-eminently a year of transition from idealism to realism. Even if we agree with Griffin that Russell does not defend a theory of possible objects in “Analysis”, there are enough important new elements in Russell’s theory which run ahead of a completely new philosophy.<sup>60</sup>

The thesis that everything that can be thought of is a unity, is one (*unum*), and that it is an entity, which has ‘being’ in a certain sense, is also implied by Twardowski’s (and Stout’s) notion of object.<sup>61</sup> Russell’s use of the term ‘being’ in “Analysis” can be compared to Twardowski’s use of the term ‘*ens*’. These terms do not have the same meaning as the term ‘being’ as used by Moore in “The Nature of Judgment”; for Moore, concepts have being in so far as they are substantial. Russell’s idea that whatever can be thought of is a logical subject is comparable to Twardowski’s idea that whatever can be the bearer of properties is an object. The idea that terms are unities, different from all other terms, is a form of pluralism, so important for the development of analytic philosophy.

Although the distinction between content and object seemed to disappear from the writings of Moore and Russell, it played an important role in getting a clearer notion of object. Both Moore and Russell held that objects are identical bearers of different properties, and that they are independent of a particular act of thought. As long as the object of thought was not clearly distinguished from the content of thought, as is the case in the theories of Brentano and Ward, it was conceived of as somehow dependent upon the act of thought. Indirectly,

<sup>57</sup> [Russell 1990b], 168, 174.

<sup>58</sup> [Griffin 1991], 279.

<sup>59</sup> [Russell 1990b], 143.

<sup>60</sup> This is not denied by Griffin, as he says that Russell’s Platonic realism originated in ‘Analysis’, see [Griffin 1993], 161.

<sup>61</sup> [Twardowski 1982], resp. 91, 37.

the distinction between content and object, as introduced by Twardowski and Stout, was of importance for Moore and Russell.

Did Russell get his theory of terms from Moore? Moore's theory of concepts is foreshadowed in his dissertation of 1898. According to Griffin, Russell did not read Moore's dissertation before he wrote "Analysis". Still, it is rather probable that Moore influenced Russell's doctrine of terms through discussions.<sup>62</sup> The idea that the object of thought is immutable, which means that it has merely an external relation with any thinking subject, that is, that terms or concepts are independent of any act of thinking, we can find in the *Principles* and in Moore's "The Nature of Judgment" alike, which means that Moore, at any rate, was the first to publish them. Although it is hard to give a proof of concrete influences, we may certainly say that Stout read Twardowski, and that he shared some of his ideas with Twardowski. We can also say that Moore and Russell read Stout. Moore's philosophy comes closer to that of Twardowski and Stout, because he shared their psychological interests. Russell says he was influenced by Moore. Further, the resemblances between the theories of Twardowski and those of Moore and Russell are striking. The main works can be presented according to year of publication. In 1894 Twardowski's *Zur Lehre* was published; in 1896 Stout's *Analytic Psychology*; in 1899 Moore's "The Nature of Judgment"; and in 1903 Russell's *Principles*. Meanwhile Moore wrote an unpublished dissertation (1898) and Russell wrote the unpublished "Analysis" (1898). Of course, there have been other influences on Moore and Russell. In his idealistic period, Russell never was such an extreme monist as Bradley had been. Earlier influences from McTaggart and Ward, and from a reading of Lotze, paved the way for Russell's pluralism as presented in his theory of terms.<sup>63</sup>

#### 4. *The theory of wholes, parts, and relations*

The theory of wholes, parts, and relations has been of great importance in the reaction to idealism, because a new such theory made it possible to present a new theory of judgment. Bradley's theory of whole, parts, and relations implies that a part cannot be considered independently of its whole. If we analyse a whole into its parts, the result of this analysis does not present us the parts as they form part of their whole; this means that for Bradley all analysis is falsification. In the end, Bradley believes that all relations, even the internal ones, are mere abstractions; all there is, is the one whole.

In the traditional theory of judgment, the notion of a mental act was needed in order to account for the unity of the truth-bearer. The judgmental act was supposed to unify two terms or ideas, so that they become related as subject and predicate. Bradley disagreed with the traditional conception of judgment as a

<sup>62</sup> [Russell 1990b], 159; [Griffin 1991], 307.

<sup>63</sup> [Griffin 1991], 39, 41.

synthesis of two ideas, but he agrees with the traditional assumption that a mental act is needed for judgment and truth. As a reaction to the psychologistic theory of judgment in the tradition, and to idealism and monism, philosophers in the nineteenth century want to guarantee that truth-bearers can be defined independently of a thinking subject; this means that the unity of the proposition is not to depend upon some mental act.

Earlier than in Britain, idealism played an important role on the continent. Similarly, the reaction towards idealism took place on the continent earlier than in Britain. Bolzano's theories in the *Wissenschaftslehre* (1837) form such a continental reaction towards idealism – and so do Brentano's theories. Bolzano is an outstanding example of a philosopher who defends the thesis that there is a plurality of propositions which are independent of a judging subject. He gave an account of the objectivity of propositions, and, thus, of the objectivity of truth and semantics. A *Satz an sich* or proposition consists of parts, which are independent of any mental act; these parts are called *Vorstellungen an sich*. Propositions have a special structure which make them belong to a category different from that of the *Vorstellungen an sich*; *Sätze an sich* form a category of their own. This means that propositions are altogether independent of a thinking mind.

In order to be able to defend such a theory of judgment and proposition, it is necessary to have a theory of wholes and parts in which it is possible to conceive of a part as independent of its whole. Although *Vorstellungen an sich* always form part of a *Satz an sich*, they can be considered independently of a *Satz an sich*, and of other *Vorstellungen an sich*; in order to explain the unity of a proposition, a *Satz an sich* is not to be considered as a collection. Similar to Bolzano, Russell and Moore were in need of such a new theory of wholes and parts when they reacted to Bradley's monistic and idealistic theory of judgment. These new theories of wholes and parts Russell and Moore could find in Stout's writings. Although in *Analytic Psychology* the theory of wholes and parts is mainly elaborated upon from a psychological point of view, such theories are easily extended to ontology, as we can see in Stout's later writings and in the writings of all Brentano's pupils. As soon as these theories are extended to philosophy in general, it makes sense to defend the thesis that analysis is a fruitful method for philosophy.

In this section I present Twardowski's and Stout's theories of wholes and parts, and I contrast their theories with those of Meinong, in order to show that Moore and Russell's theories of wholes and propositions have more in common with Twardowski's and Stout's theories than with those of Meinong.

According to Twardowski, everything that may be discerned in an object of presentation can be called a *part*, whether the parts can be separated really or only in thought. A complex has material parts; for example, houses form the material parts of a town. Twardowski follows Brentano in making a distinction between three types of material parts: parts which may exist independently of their whole (independent parts) – the houses; parts which depend on other parts



for their existence, whereas the latter may exist without the former; and parts which are mutually dependent upon each other, such as colour and extension.<sup>64</sup> Because contents of presentations can function as objects of other, reflective presentations, this theory of parts can be extended to contents, according to Twardowski.<sup>65</sup> If we analyse a book into its leaves and its binding, we may again consider the parts of these parts: the colour of a leaf and the front of the binding; the latter parts are called second-order parts of the book. In other cases we might distinguish third-order parts.<sup>66</sup> This way of analysing an object comes to an end. For Twardowski, just as for Bolzano, there are ultimate, simple and unanalysable elements.<sup>67</sup>

Every complex also has formal parts. The formal constituents of an object are relations between the singular parts and the object as a whole, called primary formal parts; or they are relations that singular parts have to each other, called secondary formal parts. The latter are, for example, the relations in which the material parts stand to one another – the (spatial) relations between the houses of a town. An example of a relation between part and whole is the relation of a house to the town to which it belongs. Formal relations of the latter type include those which we call having (the whole *has* its parts) or making up (the parts *make up* the whole) – these are called primary formal parts in a proper sense; and such relations as those of coexistence or of succession between part and whole, which are called primary formal parts in an improper sense.<sup>68</sup> Formal parts are important because they account for the unity of the whole; they account for the connection (*Form der Verbindung*) among the material parts. Twardowski only suggests how this could take place: the formal parts themselves are related to their whole, which means that there is a new relation, which again is a formal part of the same whole; this might lead to an endless regress of intertwining formal parts which hold together the parts of a whole.<sup>69</sup>

The formal parts of an object cannot be presented without a presentation of the material parts of that object.<sup>70</sup> Twardowski believes, as we have seen above, that there is an analogy between the parts of an object of presentation and the parts of the content of that presentation. A variation of this principle of analogy is Twardowski's thesis that the formal parts of an object of presentation find their correlate in the material parts of the content of that presentation.<sup>71</sup>

Properties, which Twardowski calls 'metaphysical parts', are either material parts, such as colour, weight, extension; or they are formal parts, such as having

<sup>64</sup> [Twardowski 1982], 51.

<sup>65</sup> [Twardowski 1982], 68.

<sup>66</sup> [Twardowski 1982], 49.

<sup>67</sup> [Twardowski 1982], 71.

<sup>68</sup> [Twardowski 1982], 52.

<sup>69</sup> [Twardowski 1982], 59.

<sup>70</sup> [Twardowski 1982], 87.

<sup>71</sup> [Twardowski 1982], 69-70.

colour, having extension. These formal parts are relations between whole and part. Metaphysical parts are dependent and irrepeatable parts; that is, having red hair as part of John is not identical with having red hair as part of Mary, even if the shades of red are the same. According to Twardowski the object is not a substance with accidents, but a whole of dependent parts (including properties) and independent parts, together with a relational structure. Without the parts, nothing is left. Most parts, both dependent and independent ones, can be considered apart from their whole without undergoing essential changes. Similar to Twardowski, Stout defends the thesis that objects are not substances with accidents; for him, they are wholes of parts, too. The parts of an object are particular; (being) red, (being) round, or the act of flying are particular and dependent entities (only the latter example comes from Stout).<sup>72</sup> Because of their starting-point in psychology, Stout and Twardowski conceive of properties in the first place as perceivable parts of an object. Partly for this reason they believe that properties are particular. This red that I see, which is something irrepeatable, is a property. An individual is a collection or unity of such perceivable and particular properties. In his later writings Stout calls such particular and dependent parts *abstract particulars*, which he clearly distinguishes from universals.

Stout's theory of wholes and parts also differs from Twardowski's theory. Stout does not believe that there are simple, unanalyzable elements. For Stout, objects are always apprehended as parts of some whole, although this might be a different whole at different times. Although only one side of a house is presented, I perceive it as part of the house as a whole. An element undergoes transformation when it is considered independently of its whole or becomes part of another whole, but this does not imply that analysis is discredited as a method. Knowledge of a whole, as a result of analysing the whole into its parts, is possible, although analysis does not leave everything as it is. "What is required for accurate knowledge is not that the distinct presentation which arises in the process of analysis should be identical with the indistinct presentation which is analysed, but only that it should adequately represent it."<sup>73</sup>

An ordinary relation, such as *being father of*, can relate its terms only if it forms with its terms a complex whole, for nothing else can bring together the terms with the relation.<sup>74</sup>

A whole always has a form of unity which constitutes the unity of that whole. This form of unity is a particular property of the whole. The melody and its form of unity can be apprehended when only some of the parts are apprehended. The form of unity can stay the same while the parts change, as

<sup>72</sup> [Stout 1909], I, 65; II, 199-200.

<sup>73</sup> [Stout 1909], I, 60-61.

<sup>74</sup> [Stout 1909], I, 72. This is one aspect of Meinong's principle of coincidence; the other is that there is no complex without parts standing to each other and to the complex in a relation, so that these parts constitute the whole [Meinong 1969], 289.

happens, for example, when we hear the same melody with notes in a different pitch.

For Stout, the apprehension of the form of unity of an object is a material constituent of consciousness, to be distinguished from the form of unity of a whole of apprehensions. This idea we also found in Twardowski, who said that the formal parts of an object of presentation correspond to material parts of the content of that presentation. A parallel between Twardowski's formal relations and Stout's form of unity can be found in those cases where all the relations are apprehended at once; in such cases, the form of unity is not anything different from the totality of relations occurring within a whole.<sup>75</sup> According to Stout, in simple judgments of likeness and unlikeness the relation (of likeness) coincides with the form of unity of the whole. Instead of using the term 'form of unity', Stout sometimes uses 'forms of relations'; both terms stand for a formal relation.<sup>76</sup>

Stout contrasts his position with that of Meinong. For Meinong, the founding parts of a whole can be apprehended without the whole, the founded object; the apprehension of the latter depends upon that of the former, but not the other way round. Further, the founded object can only be apprehended when the subject takes the founding objects together in an intellectual act.<sup>77</sup> Twardowski sides with Meinong in so far as he believes that the formal parts, and thus the whole, can only be apprehended when each of the material parts is apprehended. An intellectual act of synthesis, though, is not necessary for apprehending a whole, in Twardowski's theory.

In Meinong's *Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung* founded objects such as a relation of comparison, a relation of difference, and a geometrical shape are considered to be ideal, higher-order objects, which means that they are outside space and time; this makes it even more clear that they cannot be apprehended by ordinary, sensational acts in the way the founding objects are apprehended.<sup>78</sup> Later, in *Über Annahmen*, Meinong distinguishes between a complex of *a*, *b* and a relation *r* holding between *a* and *b*, on the one hand, and the proposition (*Objective*) that *a* and *b* are related by *r*, on the other hand. The proposition is an ideal object, which means that the objects *a* and *b*, which usually exist in space and time, do not make up the parts of a proposition; they only have a foundation relation with the proposition. In the next section we shall see that Meinong's theory of the proposition differs essentially from the theories of the proposition as presented by Moore and Russell, and that the latter have more in common with Stout's theory of the proposition as a whole of parts.

<sup>75</sup> [Stout 1909], I, 76.

<sup>76</sup> Stout's term 'form of unity' is a translation of Ehrenfels's term 'Gestaltqualität'. Stout also sides with Ehrenfels in defending the thesis that we do not need a special intellectual synthesis to experience the *Gestalt* quality.

<sup>77</sup> [Meinong 1969], 283, 297.

<sup>78</sup> [Meinong 1971], 389-399.

Moore's theory of concepts is atomistic: elementary concepts form the simple, unanalysable elements of the world. Things such as persons and tables are not substances with inhering accidents; they are composed of nothing but concepts, together with relations between those concepts. Material relations, such as *being father of* or *being known by* are external relations in the sense that a concept may become thus related without undergoing any changes. Some formal relations are internal relations: parts of a complex are internally related to their complex whole, because the whole is dependent upon its parts. A part, though, is not dependent upon the complex; an element may also be related to other elementary concepts to form another complex, and it would not make any difference to it.

Every complex concept can be analysed into its constituting elements. Knowledge of a thing we obtain by analysing it into its parts. "A thing becomes intelligible first when it is analysed into its constituent concepts".<sup>79</sup> Wholes or complexes are to be explained by their parts. The notion of object as a whole of parts, which is also present in Stout and Twardowski, foreshadows the idea that the method of philosophy consists in analysis, as we can see, for example, from *Principia Ethica*, where Moore writes: "when we define horse... [w]e may mean that a certain object, which we all of us know, is composed in a certain manner: that it has four legs, a head, a heart, a liver, etc., etc., all of them arranged in definite relations to one another".<sup>80</sup> Parts can be considered apart from their wholes without undergoing any changes; the method of analysis reveals all there is to an object.<sup>81</sup>

In the same year that "The Nature of Judgment" is published, 1899, Moore slightly changes his position. Whereas in "The Nature of Judgment" the world is made up of nothing but general entities, in 'Quality', an article for Baldwin's *Dictionary*, Moore says that there are both universals (*qualities*) and instances thereof. Those instances are not concrete things, but abstract parts of things, that is, particular properties.<sup>82</sup> Such a notion is also present in the writings of Twardowski and Stout, as we have seen. Further, a material thing is conceived of as a collection of such parts [cf. Moore's article on "Identity" (1900), p. 111; cf. Baldwin's *G.E. Moore*, pp. 46-48].<sup>83</sup> The term 'relation' may stand for a universal or for its particular instance. Only the particular instances of relations can relate, says Moore.

<sup>79</sup> [Moore 1899], 182.

<sup>80</sup> [Moore 1976], 8.

<sup>81</sup> Compare: "[T]he greater number of properties of objects – those which I call the natural properties – their existence does seem to me to be independent of the existence of those objects. They are, in fact, rather parts of which the object is made up than mere predicates which attach to it. If they were all taken away, no object would be left, not even a bare substance: for they are in themselves substantial and give to the object all the substance that it has." [Moore 1976], 41.

<sup>82</sup> [Moore 1901-02], 406.

<sup>83</sup> [Moore 1900-01], 111; [Baldwin 1990], 46-48.

In “Analysis” Russell also defends a theory of abstract particulars.<sup>84</sup> Just like Moore, Russell says, in the manuscript “Do Differences Differ?”<sup>85</sup> that only particularized relations are able to relate terms; universal relations miss the relating aspect. Russell’s reason for this thesis is not a very convincing one: he believes that only particularized relations can help us to avoid Bradley’s criticism of relations as involving an endless regress, but how this may happen is not clear. In the *Principles* Russell no longer defends the thesis that there are particularized relations.

We have seen above that Russell’s theory of terms corresponds with Moore’s theory of concepts, in broad outline. Whereas Moore acknowledges only one type of whole, Russell distinguishes in the *Principles* two types of wholes. For Russell, a whole is a new single term, it is one; there is no whole, though, without parts. One type of whole is called an *aggregate*, which is definite as soon as its constituents are known. The parts of such a whole have no direct relations to each other; there are only direct relations between the parts and their whole. A distinction between relations among parts and relations between parts and their whole we also found in Twardowski. The other type of whole Russell calls a *unity*, which is a whole that is not completely specified when all its parts are known.<sup>86</sup> All unities are propositions, according to Russell. Therefore, I deal with this type of whole in the next section. Because Russell, just like Moore, conceives of relations as concepts which are just as ultimate as other concepts, he is not able to explain in what such a unity consists, and how far analysis of such a whole is possible. According to Russell, the terms are what they are independent of the relation, and the relation is independent of the terms; in other words: all relations are external. In what way, then, is there a difference between aggregates and unities or propositions?<sup>87</sup>

### 5. The theory of judgment

Whereas Stout, Moore, and Russell defend a propositional theory of judgment, Twardowski’s theory of judgment is identical with Brentano’s non-propositional theory of judgment: we either acknowledge or reject an object when we judge, as Brentano says.<sup>88</sup> Therefore, we cannot speak of a direct influence of Twardowski’s theory of judgment upon those of Stout, Moore or Russell. Still, it is possible that Twardowski’s ideas had some influence on the

<sup>84</sup> [Russell 1990b], 171.

<sup>85</sup> [Russell 1993], 556-557.

<sup>86</sup> [Russell 1992], §135, 136.

<sup>87</sup> “The Classification of Relations”, in [Russell 1990a], 143-145.

<sup>88</sup> A first step towards a theory of the proposition is present in Twardowski’s *Zur Lehre* at the level of content: because all judgments are of existential form, the content of a (positive) judgment is the existence of a certain object [Twardowski 1982], 9.

theory of judgment of Moore and Russell, namely through his theory of wholes and parts, and through the mediation of Stout.

In *Analytic Psychology* Stout applies the new, non-idealistic theory of wholes, parts, and relations to the theory of judgment. Stout begins by drawing a distinction between the act of judging and what is judged. The term 'judgment', he says, is an ambiguous term, standing either for the act of judgment, which is "an acknowledgment of objective existence", or for "the objective state of things which is expressed by an affirmation or denial".<sup>89</sup> Stout gives an example of such an objective state of things: that Charles I was beheaded in the year 1649. The example makes clear that what is judged has a propositional structure, is expressible by a *that*-clause.

The proposition, or should we say state of affairs, is bearer of truth (or falsity), meaning of a sentence, and object of understanding and judging. A proposition is true if the logical subject, which is a whole of acts, states, and relations, has the predicated property, act, state or relation as its part. A proposition is conceived as a whole whose parts involve objects, qualities, and relations. The unity of the proposition is not constituted by a mental act of judging or supposing: it is apprehended along with the parts. Judging that a certain sparrow is flying involves the apprehension of the sparrow, which is called the *subject* of that judgment, and the apprehension of its flight (the *predicate*), not in isolation, but as constituents of a new whole.<sup>90</sup> These parts are apprehended together with a propositional structure, which is a formal relation of agent to action. Stout contrasts these 'forms of relations' with psychological categories: the formal relations are logical categories which are inherent in the object of thought.<sup>91</sup> Even such conjunctive expressions as 'if', 'because', 'therefore', 'then', and 'when' express relations inherent in the object of thought.<sup>92</sup>

This means that within a proposition there are relations on two levels: a (material) relation which functions as predicate, that is, as part of a proposition – instead of a relation we may also predicate an act or state according to Stout; and a formal relation connecting subject and predicate. Such a formal relation is essential for every proposition; it is a relation of agent to action, or of thing to quality. Earlier such a relation was called a *form of unity*, for it is the kind of relation which gives unity to a whole, here a proposition. The parts of such a proposition as *that the sparrow flies* are particular entities which need not be actual. I conclude that Stout conceives of a proposition as a whole of parts, and that he acknowledges a special propositional structure (the propositional form of unity) so that, for Stout, the proposition is an entity *sui generis*. In this sense Stout's position is close to that of Bolzano; the parts of the proposition, though, are for Stout not immutable: in *Analytic Psychology* they are thought of as

<sup>89</sup> [Stout 1909], I, 97-98.

<sup>90</sup> [Stout 1909], II, 199 ff.

<sup>91</sup> [Stout 1909], II, 214-219.

<sup>92</sup> [Stout 1909], II, 215.

being the particulars surrounding us, for, in this work, it is these possible objects of thought which function as meaning-entities.

The theory of judgment in the writings of Moore and Russell from 1898 onwards forms part of their new theory of wholes, parts, and relations. According to Moore in "The Nature of Judgment", what is true or false is a complex of concepts with a special relation between the concepts. Moore is the first to use the term 'proposition' for this complex. Not only the parts of the proposition, the concepts, are immutable, but also the relations between the concepts; therefore, the proposition itself is immutable too. Every proposition has at least two concepts, and a special relation between these concepts, either a truth-making relation or a relation that makes the proposition false. These relations cannot be further defined. If the truth-making relation occurs, the complex whole has a certain property, namely being true; this means that truth and falsehood are conceived of as properties of propositions.<sup>93</sup> *Truth* itself is a simple concept, and, because what is simple is logically prior to what is complex, the concept truth is prior to any proposition.

One might wonder whether, for Moore, propositions themselves are (complex) concepts, for sometimes Moore contrasts the two notions. For example, Moore says that propositions differ from concepts in that they may be either true or false.<sup>94</sup> Notwithstanding the latter thesis, Moore's propositions are nothing but complex concepts, because propositions are knowable entities, and because he says that concepts are the only objects of knowledge. Moore's theory of wholes and parts is a theory of complexes in which a propositional whole or any complex is of the same ontological and semantic category as its parts. Moore's position is, in this respect, opposite to that of Bolzano, who says that there is, besides a category of *Vorstellungen an sich*, a category of *Sätze an sich*; the latter are something of their own kind.

In Moore's theory, propositions have an important place because they fulfil four roles: they are the bearers of truth and falsity, the meanings of our sentences, objects of knowledge, belief, and perception, and objects of logical relations.

The proposition expressed by the sentence 'This rose is red' consists of the concepts *this*, *now*, *red*, and *rose*, together with a specific relation between these concepts. By *now* is meant a certain moment of time, itself a concept;<sup>95</sup> *red* is a simple concept; *rose* a complex one. For Moore, concepts are in no sense mediating entities; a proposition is about one of its concepts, about one of its parts. The proposition expressed by 'This paper exists' is about the conceptual entity *this paper*; the concept *existence* is another part of this proposition. If this paper really exists, there is a truth-making relation between these concepts. A thing which exists is a complex of concepts with a unique relation to the concept of existence. We might even say that an existing thing is

<sup>93</sup> [Moore 1899], 181.

<sup>94</sup> [Moore 1899], 179.

<sup>95</sup> [Moore 1899], 189-190.

an existential proposition.<sup>96</sup> If we perceive an existing thing, we cognize an existential proposition.<sup>97</sup> We may see the (empirical) world as the totality of true existential propositions. Still, concepts do not essentially form part of propositions; concepts are self-subsisting entities.

Typical for Moore's theory of judgment is that the truth of a judgment does not depend upon any relation of the truth-bearer with something else. It is not the case that a proposition is true because something exists; something exists, because a certain proposition is true; *truth* is logically prior to *existence*.<sup>98</sup> What the mind is and what the world is depends upon which propositions are true. The ground for the truth of a proposition is to be found in the proposition itself: the parts of the proposition, and the relations between them, determine whether the proposition is true or false; such a theory can be called an 'identity-theory of truth'.

Moore says that concepts are the elements of the world; but are they really all there is, according to his theory? Moore says: "concepts... stand in infinite relations to one another equally immutable".<sup>99</sup> It is implied by Moore's sayings that the specific way that concepts are related to one another is a concept itself. In the case of propositions, Moore says that the specific manner in which the concepts are combined in an (existential) proposition is something immediately known, like *red* or *two*. Consciousness is a 'transparent' awareness of independent objects.<sup>100</sup> The specific manner of combination which defines a true proposition is itself a concept, namely the concept *truth*.<sup>101</sup> If the relations are themselves immutable, substantial concepts, which are independent of other concepts, they will never be able to relate their terms, unless there is a complex whole of which both relations and concepts form part, and which is more than the relations together with the non-relational concepts. Moore, though, does not acknowledge such a complex whole. If the relations are not concepts, it is unclear what they are, and the world seems to consist of more than just concepts in that case, contrary to Moore's assumption. How relations can relate their terms is a problem extensively dealt with by Russell.

In the manuscript "The Classification of Relations", a paper read in January 1899, Russell says that every judgment is relational, and he distinguishes different types of relations. At least some of these types, for example transitive, asymmetrical relations, cannot be reduced to (intrinsic) properties of the related terms. Even subject-predicate judgments, if they form a type of their own at all, are relational, because predication is a relation, according to Russell; if the

<sup>96</sup> [Moore 1899], 183.

<sup>97</sup> This view is also defended by the early Russell: concerning *existence*, see [Russell 1990a], 142; concerning perception as cognition of an existential proposition, see [Russell 1973b], 34, 35.

<sup>98</sup> [Moore 1899], 180.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>100</sup> [Moore 1903], 20.

<sup>101</sup> [Moore 1899], 181.



judgment is synthetic, subject and predicate differ, and must therefore be related; if the judgment is analytic, subject and predicate are related as whole and part. Russell also makes the stronger claim that *no* relation can be reduced to predicates of the related terms. Last, but not least, relations are concepts just as ultimate as other concepts (predicates). The question that remains is: How is a relation able to relate its terms?<sup>102</sup>

In contrast to Moore, Russell was very sensitive to this problem. Analysing asymmetrical relations, Russell realized that a relative situation cannot merely consist in the related terms, together with a third entity, the relation. If we know how to explain the difference between  $aRb$  and  $bRa$  we also may know what explains the unity of the proposition.

In the *Principles* Russell says that a proposition is not completely specified when its parts are all known, because the parts in a proposition have some order, and because the proposition as a whole has properties which do not belong to the sum of the parts. When we analyse a proposition, for example 'A differs from B', we get *A*, *difference* and *B*, which is merely a list of terms; whereas the proposition is true or false, such a list cannot have one of these properties [§54, 136]. According to Russell, the relation *difference* as occurring in the proposition accounts for the unity of the proposition, but how this happens is not clear. As soon as a relation is considered independently of the proposition, it is merely taken as a term in a collection. Russell does not see that we need an extra ontological category: either we do justice to the fact that the relation *difference* essentially depends for its being on something else, which means that it is not of the same category as the related terms (Frege's position), or we consider the relation *difference* as being on a par with the related terms, and assume that there are formal relations which found the unity of the proposition (Stout's position). The latter option is not open to Russell, because he vehemently rejects the existence of internal relations. In principle, these problems are the same as in Moore's theory of the proposition. A difference with Moore is that Russell subscribes, to a certain extent, to Bradley's thesis that analysis is falsification, for, as Russell says, the unity of the proposition is destroyed through analysis, because the relation *difference* as it functions within a proposition is not the same as the relation *difference* considered outside the proposition.

Russell's notion of a proposition as a complex unity is sometimes compared with Meinong's *Objective*; for example, Russell himself did so in his article *Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions*. There are indeed some similarities between Russell's notion of proposition and Meinong's notion of objective, for both are entities expressible by a that-clause, and both types hover between the category of propositions (meaning-entities) and that of states of affairs. There are also important differences between the two notions. For Meinong, a proposition is an ideal, higher-order object, categorically different

<sup>102</sup> [Russell 1990a], 146.

from the non-propositional entities on which it is founded. The proposition is not a whole of parts in a literal sense, for in that case the whole exists only in so far as the parts exist. For Meinong, the proposition *that a round square is round* exists (*besteht*), but the round square is an object that has no existence at all. Because a proposition is an ideal, higher-order object, it cannot be apprehended by a simple act of presentation. The proposition can be apprehended only by an intellectual, synthesizing act: a judgment or an assumption. Further, there is, for Meinong, an ontological distinction between true and false propositions, the true ones have (ideal) existence; the false ones do not exist at all.

For Russell, a proposition is a complex whole of parts, which is not categorically different from its parts. The same sort of act which apprehends a part of a proposition, apprehends the proposition as a whole.<sup>103</sup> This means that the parts of the proposition must be in the same sense in which the proposition has being. Because objects such as a golden mountain may be part of a true, *subsistent* proposition, a golden mountain also has *subsistence*.<sup>104</sup> Further, for Russell, the difference between true and false propositions does not correspond to an ontological distinction; their difference consists merely in a difference of properties: being true or being false.

Stout's theory of judgment and proposition is more similar to that of Moore and Russell than Meinong's theory is. For Stout, a proposition is also a complex whole of parts, and for the apprehension of such a whole no intellectual, synthesizing act is needed. It is therefore more likely that Stout's theory of the proposition influenced Moore and Russell than that Meinong's theory of the objective did. Stout's theory of the proposition was also known to Moore and Russell earlier than Meinong's theory of the proposition, as the latter was published in 1902. There remains an important difference between Stout, on the one hand, and Moore and Russell, on the other. Stout not only sees that a proposition, or any whole, has a unity that is more than the sum of its parts, in the way Russell did, but also explains in what this unity consists: we need the notion form of unity, or to use another word, we need a category of formal relations.

### Conclusion

The theories of objects and the propositional theories of judgment of Moore and Russell are not merely immanent reactions towards Bradleian metaphysics. It cannot be proven that Twardowski's ideas influenced the origins of British analytic philosophy, but his ideas were known to Moore and Russell in crucial phases of their thinking, through mediation of the philosopher and psychologist Stout. There is no evidence that Moore and Russell knew the writings of Twardowski, but their teacher Stout read Twardowski's early writings care-

<sup>103</sup> [Russell 1973b], 52.

<sup>104</sup> [Russell 1973c], 80.

fully. Further, the general background of Twardowski's and Stout's writings is the same; both philosophers form part of the Brentano school. The fact that Twardowski and Stout draw a distinction between content and object is typical of the Brentano school. We may say that Twardowski's distinction between content and object had an indirect influence on Moore and Russell. The earlier pupils of Brentano conceived of the content as something psychological, as did Twardowski and Stout. The idea that the content was something psychological formed the semantics of Moore and Russell, too, but in a negative way. Because they consider a psychological notion of content to be too subjective to function as meaning-entity, Moore and Russell hold, just like Stout, that the objects of thought and judgment are the meanings of our terms.

Also typical of the Brentano school is to give a theory of objects, and a theory of wholes, parts, and relations, as is done by Twardowski and Stout. In the beginning, the theories of wholes and parts were presented from a psychological point of view. Later, they became part of general philosophy, including ontology. These theories give a proper place to analysis as a method for philosophy. Therefore, Brentano and his pupils can be seen as predecessors of analytic philosophy; some of these thinkers hover between analytic philosophy and analytic psychology in so far as for them language is not the central focus for philosophy, and in so far as their central questions are often restricted to philosophy of mind. These new theories of wholes and parts make it possible for Stout to present a theory of the proposition as a whole of parts, in which the unity of the proposition is not conceived of as being constituted by a mental act. Although Moore and Russell do not mention Stout in this context, it is not unlikely that Stout's notion of proposition had some influence on Moore and Russell; for them, too, the unity of the proposition is independent of an act of judgment. There is also an important difference between Stout's theory of the proposition and those of Moore and Russell: in the latter theories the unity of the proposition is proclaimed rather than explained.

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