

Tribute to Kazimierz Twardowski on the 10th Anniversary of His Death in 1938

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empirical, historical, and sociological point of view. She is influenced by the ideas of Max Weber. She has written "The Basis of a Science of Morals," a theory of moral values and norms; and a psychology of morals entitled "Motives of Behavior." In her last work, "Bourgeois Morals," Benjamin Franklin appears as the paradigm of specifically bourgeois morality. Two other types of bourgeois morality are mentioned, one represented by the Italian of the Renaissance period, Alberti, and the other by the writer of the French Enlightenment, Volney; but in the former bourgeois morality has elements of feudalism and of love of art, while it is tainted by hedonism in the latter, so that in both cases there is a lack of "purity" of the bourgeois mentality as it appears in Franklin. We see here that, to her, bourgeois morality is a class phenomenon. She considers ethics as an empirical science that investigates social phenomena.

Here it may be mentioned that the husband of Mrs. Ossowska, the noted sociologist Stanislaw Ossowski, recently published a book, "At the Bases of Aesthetics," which is considered as one of the best books written in Poland on this subject.

Catholic philosophy is represented in Poland by Stanislaw Swieżawski.

The future of Polish philosophy depends on political developments; but the intellectual climate of Poland has been at all times during the last 15 years more liberal than in Russia, and it is a safe guess that, left to themselves, the Poles would continue their intellectual independence because it squares with their national traditions.

MAX RIESER

NEW YORK CITY

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TRIBUTE TO KAZIMIERZ TWARDOWSKI ON  
THE 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF HIS DEATH IN 1938 <sup>1</sup>

**M**ORE than half a century has passed since Twardowski took over, in the autumn of 1895, his duties as professor at the University of Lwów, and 10 years have passed since his death.

<sup>1</sup> This is a slightly abbreviated version of the introductory article of the book by Tadeusz Czeżowski entitled "Philosophical Prelections" (*Odczyty Filozoficzne*) published by the Scientific Society in Toruń (Towarzystwo Naukowe w Toruniu), Contributions of the Philologico-Philosophical Division, Vol. VII, Part I (Prace Wydziału Filologiczno-Filozoficznego, Tom VII, Zeszyt I). The translation, from the Polish, is by the special editor of this issue of the JOURNAL.

Tadeusz Czeżowski is the editor of *Buch Filozoficzny*, created by Kazimierz Twardowski and mentioned in the text.

Fifty years are a long period, and we have lived to see since then two changes of philosophical interest: one occurred in Twardowski's lifetime; the second one—after his death—was brought about by the last war, although it was already prepared during the pre-war period. The end of the 19th century was the period of psychology in philosophical investigations. This was perhaps an echo of the principle already prevalent in the 18th century that a critique of cognition should have as its foundation the analysis of its genesis. This echo was strengthened by the fact that psychology was then a philosophical discipline which could boast of its greatest achievements concerning the scientific method of inquiry and its results. This dominant position of psychology in the philosophical disciplines appeared in the form of psychologism, i.e., the conception that psychology is the basic science of all sciences in the sense that the subject matter of all other sciences is given to us in mental phenomena and should therefore be investigated from a psychological point of view and by applying psychological methods and laws. Thus, for instance, logic was considered by psychologism as a discipline whose subject matter is mental processes occurring in reasoning; its task is the formulation of the laws of correct thinking. The determination of the object of investigation of physics was also to be achieved by the analysis of the psychical process of observation and by the detection of the objective elements within it; aesthetics and ethics were often identified with the psychology of feeling and will; and similarly the humanistic sciences were considered as divisions of applied psychology.

It is well-known that this state of affairs underwent profound changes in a short time thereafter: psychologism collapsed and psychology itself experienced a crisis in its concepts and methods in different directions. As a result we saw a new face of psychology, a renewal of its experimental methods, an attempt at a new determination of its subject matter and of its tasks. The collapse of psychologism was connected with a fundamental transformation of the bases of mathematics and logic; a new grasp of the essence of these sciences reached great depths; they had a flowering never before experienced. The result of all this was a phenomenon analogous to the previous psychologism, namely, a logicism in philosophy, i.e., the conception which attributes to logic the dominant role in philosophical speculation just as psychologism attributed it to psychology. This was the position of the Vienna Circle and of its neo-positivistic continuators, undoubtedly the most prominent and liveliest center of philosophical thought between the wars.

The period in which we now live shows once more a radical change of direction in world view; a turning away from philosophical minimalism—to use the term coined by Tatarkiewicz—toward maximalism. Dialectical materialism is winning new positions, the Neo-Thomist movement is increasing in size and organization, and along with them existentialism develops, linked with the German *Lebensphilosophie* of the previous decades.

These two turning points, the first of which occurred already in Twardowski's life-time, suggest the question as to the position of his own philosophical work in view of the changes mentioned. We shall find an answer if we are aware that he recommended as against both these extremist doctrines—positivistic minimalism and ideological maximalism—Aristotelian moderation. His personal scientific sympathies were closer to minimalism, but after having abandoned his former psychologistic position, he came forward—especially in his article on symbolomania and pragmatophobia—against too far-reaching logicistic tendencies. As to metaphysics, we should mark his words pronounced at the 25th anniversary of the Polish Philosophical Society in 1929<sup>2</sup>: “Who would deny that the need of a philosophical world- and life-view is ever stronger . . . ? This question is undoubtedly most important to anybody who considers the traditional religious conceptions as insufficient and does not want to walk through life thoughtlessly. But is it proper for an organization possessing and desiring to preserve its scientific character, devoted exclusively to a methodical work of inquiry, to spread some philosophical—that is metaphysical—world views? . . . Does not scientific critique forbid the acceptance and the spreading of ideas pretending to have a definitive answer to the most difficult questions that can occur to man? . . . It seems that there is an unsurpassable abyss between a philosophical, i.e., a metaphysical world view and science” (p. 8).

But let us continue to quote: “. . . the relationship of the philosophical world view to science is not as simple as its opponents sometimes assume” (p. 9). . . . “The metaphysical systems present themselves, it is true, as unscientific ideas, but at the same time as pre-scientific concepts, i.e., as concepts which science should not condemn or treat disdainfully without exception. There might be some truth in these unscientific world- and life-views that only requires scientific elaboration to exhibit its whole importance . . . and it is the special sciences that perform this task according to their range of interests. In achieving this scientific formulation

<sup>2</sup> Memorial Volume of the Polish Philosophical Society in Lwów 12 II 1904–12 II 1929, Lwów 1931, page 1 and following (*Księga Pamiątkowa Polskiego Towarzystwa Filozoficznego we Lwowie*).

of such ideas—metaphysical at the start—the special sciences coöperate on the structure of a scientific world- and life-view because the creators of the metaphysical doctrines are themselves aiming at such a scientific view insofar as they consider in their insights the results of the special scientific inquiries. Thus a certain reciprocity arises: the special sciences cull ideas, concepts, and theses from the metaphysical systems, and the latter get them back from the special sciences in a scientified form. As this process develops, the philosophical world- and life-view will emerge more and more from its unscientific and prescientific state and gradually approach the scientific world- and life-view. It will, however, only approach it, because the evolutionary process sketched above will never reach its limit . . .” (pp. 13-14).

Far from all extremism, Twardowski chose as his own field the fundamental questions of the theory of science in general. The most important among these were: the distinction of the act, of the contents, and of the object of ideas (*Vorstellungen*), the relationship of these contents to the object; the structure of the content of concepts; the relationship of the act to its creation in the mental and psychophysical fields; the relationship of a statement to its verbal utterance.

The author himself considered these fundamental works of his, in accordance with his primary psychologistic position, as psychological—which, however, they are not because they encompass no inquiry leading to the formulation of inductive psychological laws founded on any considerable observational material. They are rather contributions to the general theory of knowledge and as such they have withstood successfully the test of time. Their premises and results are in accord with the results of a methodology based on contemporary logical theories. Twardowski's idiogenic theory of judgment corresponds to the assumption of contemporary logic that the theory of sentences is the basic one. His analysis of the “concept,” which divides it into an indefinite fundamental idea and a presented judgment, may be translated into assertions about propositional functions as the modern analogues of “concepts” in older logic. As for his distinction between the mental activity and the psychophysical result of such an act, this has become one of the fundamentals of the theory of humanistic sciences.

But the influence exercised by Twardowski on our philosophical life is by no means reducible to the theoretical results of his scientific work. He acted most powerfully as an academic teacher and organizer. When he took over his chair in Lwów, very many philosophical influences met on our soil: German neo-criticism,

which was known and propagated in its various shadings, the English positivism of Mill and Spencer, and the empirio-criticism of Avenarius, to mention only the most important ones. That none of them became as fruitful as the Brentano tradition brought to us by Twardowski can only be explained by the personal activity which he developed in the two mentioned directions. Twardowski created in Poland a native philosophical style by his own example and his teaching activities; and he was able to implant and to spread it far beyond the circle of his pupils and those whom he influenced personally.

Twardowski's teaching was based on the premise that philosophical inquiry is a scientific one and should satisfy the requirements of scientific critique and rigor. . . .

Twardowski taught effectively by his own example and devised an ensemble of didactic means that became a permanent feature of the teaching of philosophy at the Polish universities. If we adopt those didactic methods today, we are not always aware that it was Twardowski who introduced and to a great extent created them himself. . . . He organized on Polish soil the first philosophical seminar and the first psychological laboratory. . . . His organizational activity in the field of philosophy was an extension of his university career. . . . Twardowski founded the Polish Philosophical Society in Lwów as the first organization of this kind in Poland. He came into close contact with Władysław Weryho, the founder and editor of *Przegląd Filozoficzny* (Philosophical Review); he initiated the publications of the Polish Philosophical Society, thus providing a framework for creative scientific work . . . and a possibility of publishing it. The Polish Philosophical Society became an expression of Polish philosophical opinion; it organized it in concert with similar associations, representing Polish philosophy at home and abroad. Soon—also due to the initiative of Twardowski—Polish philosophical meetings took place—at first together with Polish physicians and natural scientists and then in the period between the two wars, independently, as the largest organizational form of our philosophical life. Finally, we must mention apart from this the journal *Ruch Filozoficzny* (Philosophical Movement), which was founded by Twardowski and directed by him until his death, as a native organizational form of Polish philosophical thought. Its task was information about philosophical events in Poland and in the whole world, . . . *Ruch Filozoficzny* performed faithfully this task of uniting people through information and contributed perhaps most to that coherence in the Polish philosophical domain which is the merit of the whole activity of Twardowski.

Let us look now—when we are rebuilding Polish scientific life—after the cataclysm of war—at the new and old universities and the philosophical societies working along with them. We shall see that in all of them, in Warsaw, Cracow, Poznań, Wrocław, Łódź, Lublin, Toruń, the pupils of Twardowski or the pupils of his pupils are active and that they even constitute, in many universities, the majority of teachers of philosophy. Even the very terrible experiences which our Nation had to go through did not destroy the continuity created by the activity of Twardowski. Therefore I may perhaps repeat here what I said ten years ago at a memorial meeting in the Aula of the University of Lwów:

“In order to understand the results of the activity of Kazimierz Twardowski, we must consider the state of philosophy in Poland at the end of the 19th century. It developed in unconnected centers. The tradition of Romantic philosophy had died but there was nothing to replace it. Polish philosophical students, educated for the most part abroad, brought from there ideas which they tried to transplant into our soil, but there was no internal continuity of philosophical inquiry because a native school of philosophy was lacking. It was Twardowski who created one (and I want to mention that the first one to use the term “the school of Twardowski” was Władysław Weryho in the article “A Decade of ‘Przegląd Filozoficzny,’” *Przegląd Filozoficzny*, Vol. XI, 1908, page iv).

“This school was ready when we regained independence and it was strong and sound to such an extent that it became dominant not only in the newly created posts of philosophical activity in the whole of Poland but impressed also students of philosophy not linked with it directly. They did not abandon their convictions or the subjects of their inquiries but the methodological exigencies, the formulation of philosophical questions characterizing the school of Twardowski became general in Polish philosophical work. The carefulness in terminology, the exactness and clarity, one would like to say the soberness, of philosophical thinking, the native type of rationalism and realism that marked the philosophical work of Twardowski, all this became a requirement of correctness that transcended the limits of direct and indirect pupils of Twardowski.

“Thus the influence of the philosophical activity of Twardowski spread over Poland, creating a certain style of philosophical work and uniting thereby the *disjecta membra* of Polish philosophy. It also created a unity in terms of time. For years the pupils of Twardowski have been active in the philosophical chairs,

a new generation of their pupils have taken up the philosophical work, some of them even as academic teachers. . . . This is not merely a repeating of the words of the Master. The most prominent among Twardowski's pupils went their own ways . . . but the continuity of development remained untouched and with it the unity of philosophical work. . . .”

If we talk today at the 10th anniversary of Twardowski's death about Kazimierz Twardowski . . . his teachings are still alive, especially the main principle: the requirement of scientific method in philosophical inquiry, and also other demands which he addressed to philosophers: those of honesty, impartiality, courage. . . .

TADEUSZ CZEŻOWSKI, 1948

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### THE CONCEPT OF ACTION \*

THE purpose of my analysis is to formulate and comment upon a definition of action which would serve the purpose of praxiology. The business of praxiology is to investigate the essence of the process of action, and to clarify all those concepts which are indispensable for the description, appraisal, and planning of action, and for the general theory of efficient action. I should like to give some idea of the contents of my praxiological book, entitled *Treatise on Good Work*. In order to do so, I have decided to choose an important problem, to concentrate on it, and thus to show the whole, so to speak, through that selected problem.

The concept of action will be based on the concept of causal relationship, defined so as to suit our purpose. The change which consists in the contact A of the body  $x$  with the body C at the time  $t_A$  is the cause of the change B in the body D at a later time  $t_B$ , and B is the effect of A, if, and only if, A is a necessary element of every set of changes at the time  $t_A$ , which set is a sufficient condition of the change B with respect to a law of sequence of changes. For instance, a grain of pollen falls on the stigma of the pistil and a ripe fruit is formed there after a period of time. We say, again, that the contact (A) of the pollen ( $x$ ) with the pistil (C), which took place at a certain period of time ( $t_A$ ), was the cause of the forming (B) of the fruit (D) during the time ( $t_B$ ) filled by that process (and that B was the effect of A), because a certain set of events simultaneous with the contact of the pollen with the

\* Revised text of a lecture delivered by the author at the University of California at Berkeley during his visit to the United States in 1959.—EDITOR.