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ON IDIO- AND ALLOGENETIC THEORIES OF JUDGMENT¹

A series of new logical texts have appeared in Polish over the past several years: those of Pechnik, Gabryl, Nuckowski, Biegański (two), Brzozowski, Lutosławski, and my own. Only my text adopts the idiogenetic perspective with respect to the essence of a judgment, whereas all of the others subscribe to one of the allogenetic theories. The characteristic common to all the allogenetic theories is that they reduce every judgment to being synthetic or analytic, to some combination or interrelation of representations (i.e., intuitions or concepts). Moreover, they regard this synthesis or analysis, this combination or interrelation, as an essential constituent of the judgment. A further characteristic of allogenetic theories that follows from this one is the tenet that at least two representations have to occur in every judgment. These representations would either have to be bound together, synthesized, or combined, or else have to be separated out by means of analysis from an initially single representation. According to the proponents of the allogenetic theory, this also implies that a "subject" and "predicate" belong among the essential and indispensable components of every judgment. For those are the names given to the two constituent representations. Idiogenetic theories differ from the allogenetic in the following respects: (1) they do not consider representations to be essential constituents of the judgment, but rather conditions for it; (2) they do not insist that two representations are necessary for making a judgment, since a single one often suffices; (3) they see in the act of judging a mental phenomenon *sui generis*, and not some sort of synthesis, combination, or analysis of representations.

According to the form of idiogenetic theories proposed by the present writer, an act, content, and object should be distinguished in every judgment. The judgment's act is an affirmation (acceptance) or denial (rejection).

¹ I. Dąmbska, the editor of the volume of Twardowski's writings in which this paper appears, attached the following footnote to its title: "The terms 'allogenetic' and 'idiogenetic,' introduced by Hillebrand (*Die neuen Theorien der kategorischen Schlüsse*, 1891) and used here by the author, are not etymologically correct, as pointed out by D. Tennerówna (*Istnienie jako "treść" sążenia i sądu. Kilka uwag na marginesie teorii sądu Prof. Twardowskiego* [Existence as the "Content" of Judging and the Judgment. Some Remarks on Prof. Twardowski's Theory of Judgment], *Przegląd Filozoficzny*, XVII, 1914, n. 4, p. 465). The correct terms that have been adopted in Polish philosophical terminology read "allogenic" and "idiogenic" – [derived] not from γένεσις, but from γένος." (K. Twardowski, *Wybór pism filozoficznych* [Selected Philosophical Writings], Warszawa: PWN, 1964, p.198). [Tr.]

Actuality (existence) is the content of every judgment. The object of the judgment is that of which we affirm (accept) or deny (reject) actuality (existence). In the judgment "God exists," the object is God; in making this judgment we accept or affirm the actuality, that is, the existence, of God. In the judgment "Two times two is four," we accept the existence of equality between the product that results from multiplying two by two and the number four; here, the object is the equality between the product and that number, hence, a certain relation. The fact that the object of a judgment is most frequently some sort of relation was one of the catalysts for the genesis of the theory according to which every judgment is composed of two representations. For every relation requires at least two terms between which it obtains. In representing a relation to ourselves, we must also have representations of both its terms, and these representations generally correspond to what in our sentences (i.e., the verbal expressions of the judgments) are called "subject" and "predicate." We say "generally," and not always, because the function of predication varies from sentence to sentence, as attested by the sentence "God exists," in which the predicate expresses not the second term of a relation (as it does in the sentence "Two times two is four"), but rather the content of the judgment (exists) along with the act that affirms it (indicative case). The differentiation of subject and predicate therefore pertains either to the judgment's object or to the different ways of expressing the judgment in speech, but has nothing to do with the essence of the judgment. This follows from the fact that there are judgments in which it is impossible to identify a subject, namely, the so-called "subjectless" or "impersonal" judgments, such as "It is raining," "There is erosion," "There was a battle," etc.²

These impersonal judgments constitute an *experimentum crucis*, as it were, for deciding whether the allogenetic or idiogenetic theory ought to be preferred. For, all theories of this sort have the character of hypotheses, and given two hypotheses from which to choose, we give preference to the one that (1) embraces the greatest number of relevant facts, and (2) does not require auxiliary hypotheses for explaining those facts. When we apply these criteria to the problem at hand, we must concede: (a) that the allogenetic hypotheses, which regard subject and predicate as essential constituents of every judgment, do not account for subjectless and impersonal judgments; (b) that in the effort to explain these judgments without falling into inconsistencies, the allogenetic hypotheses must resort to auxiliary hypotheses, which admit the existence of "hidden," "putative," or "indeterminate" objects. Irrespective of the merits of these auxiliary hypotheses, it must be noted that the sheer necessity of employing them vitiates the value of the principal hypotheses.

² I have replaced Twardowski's examples with ones that are more idiomatic to colloquial English. [Tr.]

The idiogenetic hypotheses, on the other hand, embrace judgments of every sort in a uniform and equally simple way, without having to resort to auxiliary hypotheses that are constructed *ad hoc*. They differentiate an act, content, and object in every judgment without exception. According to the idiogenetic view, in the judgment "It is raining" we affirm the actuality of the phenomenon "rain," just as in the judgment "God exists" we affirm the actuality of God, and in the judgment "Two times two is four" we affirm the actuality – that is to say, the existence or occurrence – of equality between the product of two and two and the number four. Thus, if we adhere to the methodological principles that are binding on every scientific inquiry and on the assessment of the value of all hypotheses whatsoever, preference must be granted to idiogenetic theories over the allogenic.